中国凸现停滞性通胀阴影 雪灾加剧悲观前景

路透北京1月30日电(记者Simon Rabinovitch)---暴雪侵袭和全球经济低迷给中国经济造成比预想更为严峻的挑战，使中国在面临经济增长放缓的同时，也面对通货膨胀的威胁。

这套连环威胁不禁令人质疑中国政府的货币紧缩政策，分析人士表示，中国政府需要高度警觉保证经济不会脱轨。

中国近几个月来打出一系列货币紧缩组合拳，包括控制银行信贷，允许人民币更快升值，这些为通胀压力开出解药，但可能会恶化增长放缓局面。

“政府可能面临收紧过度的两难困局，”美国银行(Bank of America)经济学家王涛表示。“政府非常很清楚，如果外需进一步疲软，他们可能相对迅速地放宽控制，”她表示说。

经济学家称，在冰雪导致食品供给不畅的形势下，原本认为去年已达到顶峰的通胀幅度，将会再度跃升至11年来最高点，CPI同比增幅至少达到7%。

与此同时，中国经济的疯狂涨势，在今年可能比2007年11.4%的增幅稍有放缓，因美国经济的低迷可能拖累中国的出口。而过去一周罕见雪灾天气导致工业腹地能源短缺，则可能进一步拖累中国经济。

国际货币基金组织(IMF)预期中国经济今年的增幅为10%，分析人士中最悲观的论调是稍低于9%。

那些都很难称之为灾难，但部分经济学家表示，当中国的城市将没有能力吸纳数以百万农民工的时候，中国经济可能才接近痛点。

“我们真正需要担心的是：中国可能陷入停滞性通膨， ”北京大学金融教授佩蒂斯(Michael Pettis)说。

停滞性通胀是指发达国家曾在1970年代因石油恐慌而遭遇的经济停滞、而物价上扬局面，但佩蒂斯表示，9%的增幅对中国而言已经算很低了。

“在中国，经济滞涨的定义是指在某一增幅下，就业率已不足以吸纳新增劳动力，”佩蒂斯说。

移动性目标

中国在新年来临之际宣称，经济核心任务是预防经济过热，同时保持稳定增长，控制通货膨胀。

他们的预想是，现有的一套政策--较高利率、人民币逐步升值、放缓信贷等，可能实现这些目标。

但经济难题的堆积，可能迫使政府在经济增长和通货膨胀间作出两难选择。截至目前，中国政府的论调是努力遏制通货膨胀。

政府担心食品价格飙升可能加剧民众的不满情绪，因而采取一系列价格控制措施，这是中国政府逾10年来对食品市场最强力的一次干预。

然而较为黯淡的经济增长前景，可能改变中国政府的小九九。“如果真的出现增长放缓，失业问题可能成为头等大事，”佩蒂斯说。

很肯定的是，中国经济在陷入高通胀和低增长的泥沼之前，还有很长的路要走。

实际上，部分分析人士很有信心的认为，中国通胀在2008年下半年会有所缓解，而美国经济的复苏会缓解中国的出口形势。但严寒天气导致交通瘫痪，数千工厂停止生产，已经令这一良好预期蒙上阴影。

“我们怀疑中国的工业生产的马达能够迅速重启，在今年第一季，出口可能会尤为疲软，”兴业银行亚洲首席经济学家Glenn Maguire在研究报告中表示。

中国人民银行则密切关注最新一轮信贷紧缩政策的成效。去年第四季信贷增长急剧下降，部分公司已报怨难以筹集资金。
由于货币紧缩的政策来自于中国政府最高决策层--国务院的要求，央行要缓解这一政策颇有难度。

“面对中央政府的要求，央行能采取降息措施的可能微乎其微，”一位央行官员表示，他要求匿名发表，因他未被授权向媒体开口。(完)

暴风雪让中国经济问题大暴露
撰稿 顾蔚

路透香港1月30日电--一场50年不遇的大雪,把中国改革开放30年没有解决的问题暴露得一览无遗.这是一场天灾,也夹杂着多年来政策不当而埋下的隐患.国家既然放开了煤价,那就不能压制电价,否则基础价格机制的扭曲,将进一步加重中国经济的失衡.北京试图越管越多,不仅对解决通胀问题于事无补,反而可能把中国重新拉回商品短缺的时代.

全国17个省级电网电力供应紧张的根本原因是缺煤.煤价已经放开,市场价格飞涨.而电价依然受国家控制,因为要防止通货膨胀而被压在低位.如果发电要亏损,发电厂当然没有动力这麽做,尤其现在不少电厂已经是上市公司.前一阵电厂不愿多储煤,截止1月25日,全国电煤库存约2,142万吨,不到正常时期的一半.电价依然便宜,用电者就没有动力节电,或者转用其他能源.这就使得大雪一来,用电负荷飞涨,把电厂搞得措手不及.

事实上大雪让电网大面积瘫痪,也和电网公司资金紧张有关.电厂和电网分开後,用于电网改造和建设的国有资金不足,使得电网公司负债率提高,造成电网改造和建设严重滞後.

定价机制不合理已让中国屡屡品尝到"油荒"的滋味,现在又多了一个"电荒".政府为抑制通货膨胀,稳定物价,而限制商品价格,启动临时价格干预机制,并不断提醒和要求企业不许涨价.这些行政手段可能让问题越来越糟,日後难说会出现"米荒","肉荒","棉花荒".

高盛的中国经济学家梁红指出,价格管制是与中国30年改革开放的精神相违背的."政府如果要走回头路,那麽就只能百分之百地回,不过大家答应不答应?"梁红说. "如果要管价格,那麽甚麽都要管.否则放开煤,电要涨价;放了饲料,不放猪价就不行.80年代农民有句话,议价的饲料,平价的猪.谁养猪,谁是猪!"

管制导致短缺

梁红指出,世界上通货膨胀最高的国家是津巴布韦,通胀达到8,000%,就是因为政府不仅要求控制价格,还要求价格减半.美国70年代尼克松总统也限制油价和粮价,结果还是没有能够改变通货膨胀大局.通货膨胀一旦起来,挤泡沫的过程是相当痛苦的,必定要以生产活动的倒退为代价.

不仅是中国,能源和农产品价格全面上涨,带动世界上不少国家实行零售价管制的政策,但目前看来效果并不理想.就在中国去年限制方便面涨价的时候,俄罗斯正对部分基本食品采取价格管控,把面包、奶酪、鸡蛋与蔬菜、油等价格冻结于2007年10月水平.

经历过计划经济时代的人,都知道价格管制的直接结果就是商品短缺,曾几何时,中国买甚麽东西都要凭券.不少经济学家批评说,俄国政府的价格管控措施,等于是回到苏维埃干预市场的时代.俄罗斯2007年通胀水平高达11.9%,当地有经济学家质疑,行政措施是否能够帮助解决问题,敦促中央银行还是采取货币紧缩的政策,来应对通胀.不过,和中国一样,俄罗斯政府也不愿意让卢布快速升值,或大举提高利率.

也有国家采取补贴的方式,比如埃及政府增加面包补贴,巴西政府为了减少物价上涨带来的贫困问题,实施"有条件现金资助"计划.但政府直接向经济注入现金,等于是进一步充盈货币供应,导致通胀的泡沫越吹越大.

追究中国通胀的深层次原因,还是人民币被低估.这导致顺差大量积累,和外国热钱不断涌入.货币过于充裕导致的问题,还需要用货币政策来解决.米尔顿.弗雷德曼指出,通货膨胀无论在哪里,在何时,都是一个货币现象.

不过,中国政策制定者因为国际央行在减息,不敢大幅升息,这就使得他们在处理现在的通货膨胀问题方面,显得束手无策,用梁红的话说是"头痛医脚",因为矛盾积累到了一定程度,就有动力自己走,对中国央行来说,可选择的手段越来越少.现在世界通胀水平没有到警戒线,但亦值得各国央行关注.

"通胀丝丝甜,似毒药,"梁红说."现在全世界通胀水平不高不低,就看各国央行有没有政治决心来解决问题."(完)

China's fear of inflation
Jan 31st 2008
From the Economist Intelligence Unit ViewsWire

Efforts to cool the economy may undo crucial reforms

Faced with rising consumer prices and signs of runaway growth, the Chinese Communist Party in November issued a strongly worded statement vowing to stem inflation and slow investment. At the time market players paid scant attention to it. But as the State Council's increasingly stringent policies show no signs of letting up even in the face of global financial turmoil, players in China's property and equity markets are at last waking up to the harsher reality. In recent weeks both housing and stock prices have started to retreat from their irrationally exuberant highs. Chinese policymakers, however, should be careful of what they wish for. Falling asset prices could bring back an old problem that many thought had been conquered: bad debts in the banking system. Meanwhile, inflation is reviving throwback elements of state economic planning.

Deflating housing prices was not an explicit goal of the party's November statement. But Chinese leaders were clearly worried about the froth in the market. For five years housing prices enjoyed average annual growth of more than 5% nationally, according to Liu Shiyu, a deputy governor of China's central bank. In 2007 the pace picked up even more, with prices rising 10% year on year through October. There were other unwelcome trends. For example, in December Mr Liu revealed that nearly 80% of new housing investment in the first ten months of 2007 went into units bigger than 90 sq metres. These flats are well beyond the means of most ordinary Chinese households. So why were developers building them? The obvious answer was that they were focusing on "investment grade" luxury housing targeted at speculators.

To cool the property market, the government began tightening on all fronts. It raised both interest rates and banks' reserve requirements. It also stiffened administrative controls. In December the China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC) declared that the large state-owned banks' lending in 2008 could not exceed the total amount they lent in 2007. In fact, in the case of Bank of China, it was told to extend Rmb20bn (US$2.8bn) less in loans than it did in 2007. For borrowers, authorities imposed higher down-payment requirements. At the same time, the central government and local governments of major cities rolled out aggressive plans to provide various grades of subsidised housing at below average market prices. A new regulation also required property developers to pay fully for leased land before obtaining the deed. The central government sent roving inspection teams to make sure local officials were implementing its myriad decrees.

These measures are having a noticeable impact. National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) figures on housing prices in December revealed tepid month-on-month growth for much of the country and a decline in formerly hot markets such as Guangzhou, Shenzhen and Wenzhou. As the number of transactions has dwindled, prices in the key markets of Shanghai and Beijing have also stagnated. Investors are now holding their breath to see if these two bellwether cities will witness drops in property prices.

Victims of their own success
Chinese policymakers are, in a way, victims of their own success. During the past few years China has enjoyed record current-account surpluses, which have allowed the central government to use ballooning foreign-exchange reserves to recapitalise sickly state-owned banks. Flush with cash, the banks have fuelled spectacular rallies in both property and stocks, which have sent even the prices of their own newly listed shares into the stratosphere.

In heated competition with each other to lend money, banks have flouted both basic risk-management practices and government regulations. They looked the other way when borrowers did not have all the paperwork. Since September buyers have had to make a 40% down payment for a second mortgage. But most banks interpreted the rule as applying only to individuals, and not to households. Thus, a large number of borrowers simply had their spouses or children take out mortgages and kept speculating in the property market. In other instances, CBRC officials discovered that local bank branches accepted false documentation showing proper down payments where none existed. Such lax lending has led to a Rmb1trn increase in housing loans in the first ten months of 2007, or nearly one-third of all new bank loans made during that period. Bank regulators have publicly raised alarm about these highly leveraged mortgages, which look uncomfortably like their sub-prime counterparts in the US.

On the stockmarket front, the CBRC has long-standing regulations forbidding the purchase of shares with bank loans. In reality, though, it is all but impossible to enforce how the money is spent once it leaves bank vaults. And in the great Chinese bull market of 2007, it did not really matter anyway because most people were making a killing on stocks and promptly repaying their loans. Indeed, Chinese banks were indulging their own speculative urges by investing in junk US mortgage-backed securities.

As the sub-prime crisis deepens in the US, the Chinese euphoria is beginning to evaporate. Bank of China, one of the country's largest commercial banks, recently admitted that it would need to write off a substantial amount of its investment in US sub-prime mortgages. Although the evidence is far from conclusive, a senior CBRC official admitted at a meeting in mid-January that non-performing loans (NPLs) were showing initial signs of reversing their decline of recent years.

Should China's housing and share prices follow a sustained downward trajectory, a serious NPL problem would no doubt rear its ugly head again. To be sure, China does not seem in danger of plunging into a bank-liquidity crisis. Unlike many developing countries that have suffered such financial emergencies in the past, China has more than enough bank reserves and foreign exchange to thwart a similar fate. Still, a sudden spike in NPL ratios would reveal to the world that China's economic reform is far from complete. It would show that, despite their record market valuations, Chinese banks are not in much better shape than their Western counterparts.

Government orders
In fact, Chinese banks might feel they are by far the unhappier bunch, because they must continue to endure the blunt instruments wielded by bureaucrats in Beijing. An important feature of many Chinese banks--and companies--is that they remain state-owned entities which must obey government orders whatever the consequences for their businesses. When the government repeatedly jacked up banks' reserve requirements in 2007, they had to forgo profitable loans and park their money in low-interest accounts at the central bank. What is more, they were even saddled with central-bank bonds which the government forced them to purchase at below-market discount rates. These obligations squeezed all banks' profit margins.

Similarly, despite record oil prices on the global markets, the central government has ordered national oil companies to import crude oil, continue refining and sell petrol domestically at mandated prices. Some state oil giants, such as Sinopec and PetroChina, protested by briefly slowing down production. But they ultimately had to obey their government minders' commands to maintain supply. Even China National Offshore Oil Corp, which primarily engages in exploration and drilling, had to build its own refinery to help the state satisfy the country's soaring petrol demand.

Elsewhere, as food prices gallop upwards, the government has asked state-owned agricultural companies to maintain supply at fixed prices. More recently the NDRC has forbidden large food-processing companies, fertiliser-makers and retailers from raising prices of grain, meat, eggs, dairy products and fertilisers without government approval. No one knows how effective these steps will be in fighting inflation.